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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SARAH ANN ANDERSON, 
Applicant-Appellant, 
v. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, BARCO OF UTAH, STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents 
. : 
Case No. 19128 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from an Order of the Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, Timothy C. Allen, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
FRANK NELSON 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
THOM D. ROBERTS of 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
10 West 300 South, Ste. 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JAMES R. BLACK 
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ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT STATE INSURANCE FUND 
AND BARCO OF UTAH 
GILBERT MART INEZ 
350 East 500 South 
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FILED 
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Ir! THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
·J;RAH Aflfl AflDERSotl, 
Applicant-Appellant, 
Case No. 19128 
THE !llDIJSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UfAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SlCURITY, BARCO OF UTAH, STATE 
Il'JSURNJCE FU1JD, and SECOND 
IrlJURY FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Applicant-Appellant, Sarah Ann Anderson, seeks 
compensation benefits against the Defendants for in-
;1iries she received on a ]Ob while working for the Defendant, 
Barco of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Industrial Commission granted to the Applicant-
AppPllant limited recover, for permanent partial disability, as 
·•Pl l as gr,mting an early date of stabilization. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
rhe Applicant-Appellant requests this Court to reverse 
• l1•r , ,f r.he Industrial Commission and grant the Applicant-
1·'1' 1 ldnt a new hearing with regard to her injuries and compen-
-,,-:) t 1 <)[]. 
UF FAt_·rs 
The ··,1,1:--., ·,r1 1=11n,1ll'/ 1r·1 J1 1 rr_"J 1 
place of employment on March 7, i:e. '.::iht_' n-::"'-{Ut-:'st ...... c·r)rnp•"Ti, 
tion, which was originally denied, but prior to any hearing, 
liability was admitted and payments were made. 
The Applicant-Appellant developed further complica· 
and problems with her inJuries. The Applicant-Appellant thecc. 
fore sought additional benefits. Subsequent to a hear mg, tr.; 
matter was referred to a Medical Panel, consisting of Dr. 
Hess. Dr. Hess completed his examination, and issued h1 s r"e·; 
cal Panel Report. On April 21, 1981, the Appllcant-Appelian: 
filed a timely objection to the finding of the Medical Pane: 
Report. 
Shortly after the filing of the objection to the·"-
cal Panel Report, Judge Foley of the Industrial Comm1ss1on c0r-
tacted the attorney for the Applicant-Appellant. At that t1c•' 
Judge Foley indicated that he would be basing his ruling up;r 
the treating physician Dr. McQueen, rather than a Medical Poe' 
Report, and therefore questioned the necessity for a heanng. 
The treating physician Dr. McQueen had substantially greater 
centage of the permanent partial d1sab1 l i ty attributable to· 
accident, and an additional 1-l: to 2 years of temporary 
disability rating. As a result of the statements by F 
the Applicant-Appellant did not request a hearing on her •Ji:· 
tions to the Medical Panel Report. By letter- elated May f. 
counsel for the Applicant-Appellant memor-1alu·ed '=ne pltJne 
versation with Judge Foley and thP requPsl 
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Further, copies were sent to the Applicant-
1 1 u:t ,w] I as the attorney for the Defendants, Barco of 
11ra1-1 dJ1 1 1 Insurance Fund. 
On August 18, 1981 Judge Foley issued his Findings of 
F 0 c ts, Cone l us ions of La•1 and Order. At that time, he adopted 
the Medical Panel Report and entered an Order in accordance 
trere'111th. rhe Applicant-Appellant than timely filed an Objec-
t1on to the Findings of the Medical Panel, Petition for Review 
dnd Request for Hearing on the Objections to the Medical Panel 
RPprirt. 
The subsequent hearing was held on April 16, 1982. At 
that time, present were Judge Joseph C. Foley, the Applicant-
Appellant, her attorney, Mr. James R. Black, attorney for State 
Insurance Fund and Barco of Utah, and Timothy Allen, Administra-
tor ctnd Attorney for the Second Injury Fund. Called to testify 
about the hearing were Dr. W.E. Hess, who constituted the Medical 
Panel, and Dr. Craig H. McQueen, the treating physician of the 
'PP l icant -Appellant. 
At the beginning of the hearing, the issue was raised 
as "o the propriety of the hearing by Mr. Timothy Allen. Counsel 
fr the Applicant-Appellant indicated to Judge Foley the phone 
·d I U1dt l1Jdge F•Jley had made to him, and the necessity for the 
• ri 1 /H U1dt time, Judge Foley told the attorney for the Ap-
'"t c\ppellant that could not possibly have happened, but 
f111ctlly c1cknoifdedged existence of the letter dated May 6, 1981. 
c•1nr1'-'r, the Administrative Law Judge indicated that in his entire 
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twenty yea rs, he had on 1 y one,_, n' • t r', l J '' '' J I ',11 i I''-,] P J., 
Report. Judge d 1 l n(Jt .1t t !1 11 
of the hearing, but let th"' !\P.;1·11111 p1 
taken. Dr. Hess, the Medical Panel, ri:?ce1vPd nt the tun(, ''l 
hearing certain tests which he had not previously had arid h-
made his opinion. Said tests demonstrated the significant 
jury and damage as testified to by the treating physiricHi 
Judge Foley after the hearing continued to refuse 
issue any Order in the case. He then retired 
4 or 5 months later. Mr. Timothy Allen, attorney for the 0,. 
Injury Fund, was duly appointed as an Administrative Lavi J1,c·-
for the Industrial Commission. On January 25, 1982, Mr. 
Allen, formally attorney for the Second Injury Fund, issue1 
Order in the above entitled case adopting the Medical Pane: 
port. A Petition for Review was timely filed, and the Indus· 
Commission affirmed the Order previously entered. Appllcan•-
Appellant than sought this timely revie•"1 in the Supreme CVJ' 
POINT I: 
ARGUMENT 
THAT IT WAS IMPROPER FOR JUDGE 
FOLEY TO HAVE SAT AS 
LAW JUDGE IN THE ABOVE CASE. 
This point has two related but separate grounrls. 
first is that Judge Foley was disqualified, dnd therf-'t0r• 
not have heard the case. The second is that his actin<) "-
minstrative Law Judge in this case constitutes a den1d. 
process of the Applicant-Appellant. 
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,,,,, in essence called the counsel for the Applicant-
" 1 Ii rlr- that Judge Foley would never have contacted 
lud•JP culey iJent on to deny the existence of the 
1el1 '•Jh1ch counsel had sent memorializing the phone call. He 
finally the existence of the letter, but indicated 
e nad no• made the statements to counsel. Thus, for an Applicant 
1 0 off with a Judge who does not, or will not believe coun-
sel puts the Applicant at a great disadvantage. Additionaly, 
•he cicmonstra•ion of counsel's accuracy would leave a bias and 
prtc]U(lice in the Judge's mind against counsel for the Applicant, 
oncl to the Applicant. 
fhe second concern over bias and prejudice statements 
•he Administrative Law Judge concerns his ability to waive 
·ne medical evidence in the case. Judge Foley indicated that it 
•rlS his policy to affirm the Medical Panel, and in his twenty 
;ears had only once found the medical evidence as presented by 
•rea•ing physicians, as opposed to the Medical Panel. As such, 
'h1s constitutes a bias and prejudice and leaning in favor of 
Panel Reports, and challenges his ability to consider 
11 .. arinqs and evidence on an Objection to a Medical Panel Report. 
Various Utah statutes and constitutional provisions 
'i'i', / ,'1i "h r·eqard to disqualification for bias and prejudice. 
,, • ,,f the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly makes 
" I I'',, iuriice against a party or his attorney as a ground 
Additionally, the Utah Constitution in 
H. 13 deals with the disqualification of the Judges. 
·1,,,,,,1, ,,, 1 ,·vp[i,-itly stated, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that constitution provision rPqu1t'f-".'S 
Haslam v. Morrison, l'JU P . .Cd. c -''' 11 I j I ,-j tl l t • I [ , /+ ':-; I . 
the Judge's statements, as well dS his refusal t:u issue 
demonstrate bias and prejudice. As such, this Court should 
verse and remand the matter back do1rm for a new hearing ·wu.n 
unbias and unprejudice Administrative Law Judge. 
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Couo 
have found and held that the due process clause of the Feder• 
and State Constitution requires an impartial and unbiased 
In Vali Convalescent and Care Inst. v. Industrial Commiss10n 
Utah, 649 P.2d. 33 (Utah, 1982) a claim was made that it .1as 
denied due process because the hearing concerning increase •r 
wages to the Industrial Commission was heard by employees oi 
Industrial Commission. This Court did not there hold that su,:· 
was denial of due process. However, the Court stated, at pauc 
36-7: 
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is 
a basic requirement of due process." 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 
75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). 
"It has also become the prevailing view 
that '[m]ost of the law concerning dis-
qualification because of interest ap-
plies with equal flow administrative 
adjudicators."' Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 
U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 
L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (quoting in part K. 
Davis, Administrative Law Text Section 
12.04 (1972). A biased decision maker 
is not only comstitutionally prohibited, 
"[b]ut our system of Law has alwdys en-
deavored to prevent even the probability 
of unfairness." In re Murchison, )40 11.s. 
at 136, 75 S.Ct:. at f025. 
In Marshall v. Jerr1cn, Jn,:. 
1610 ( 1980) the Supreme Court v1as conr·en11n,1 it 
-F, - ... 
, , , r I, it1· ,r 'Otandards Act and the administrative hearings con-
I' j ._ 11'_' II-?] n • Claim was made that based upon financial in-
1,-; the agency, v1ho •;1as now due processed to have the 
""'H i11•J done by the agency and that particular employee. The 
rourt there held that the financial interest was too remote to 
itself with the due process clause. However, the Court 
J1d discuss the due process rights to an impartial tribunal. 
rhe Court stated, at page 1613: 
"'J t-'I il 1,._11 
The Due Process Clause entitles a per-
son to an impartial and disinterested 
tribunal in both civil and criminal 
cases. This requirement of neutrality 
in adjudicative proceedings safeguards 
the two central concerns of procedural 
due process, the prevention of unjus-
tified or mistaken deprivations and the 
promotion of participation and dialogue 
by affected individuals in the decision-
making process. See Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 259-262, 266-267, 98 S.Ct. 
1042. 1043. 1050-1052. 1053. 1054. 55 
L.Ed.2d 252, (1978). The neutrality re-
quirement helps to guarantee that life, 
liberty, or property will not be taken 
on the basis of an erroneous or distorted 
conception of the facts of the law. See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344, 
96 S.Ct. 893, 907, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 
At the same time, it preserves both the 
appearance and reality of fairness, "gen-
erating the feeling, so important to a 
popular government, that justice has been 
done," Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172, 71 S.Ct. 624, 
649, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring I, by ensuring that no person 
will be deprived of his interests in the 
absence of a proceeding in which he may 
present his case with assurance that the 
cJrbiter is not predisposed to find against 
him. 
The requirement of neutrality has been 
Jealously guarded by this Court. 
1nd1cated above, the due process concerns go to the 
,,, unbiased and impartial tribunal, as well as the 
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appearance thereof. In the case at bar, 1t is ,_ 1.,., 
there is sufficient problems 'JJlth this hedr-in<J ,1ff 1c,,r '" 
the actual due process rights of the ApplH·ant c1er·c· J,,n,, 
However, based upon the statements and actions ot tt 1e Adr"'"-
strative Law Judge Foley, it is clear that there is a strur,,
1 
appearance of impropriety. Such also cal ls for the protect_ 
of the due process cl a use and a reversal of this case. Thu•. 
it is submitted that this case should be remanded for new 
proceedings and hearings in the Industrial Commission 'tJith; 
new hearing examiner. 
POINT II: IT WAS IMPROPER FOR JUDGE ALLEN 
TO HAVE SAT AS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE IN THE ABOVE CASE. 
This issue, concerning the Judge who ultimately 51 ,,_ 
the Order in the above case, concerns itself with t·,10 grow·,a-
The first, again, is that Judge Allen was disqualified from 
as the Administrative Law Judge. The second ground is that 
him to so act constitutes a denial of due process rights of 
Applicant-Appellant. 
In this case, Judge Timothy Allen initially appeare, 
as the Administrator and Attorney for the Defendant, Secona 
Fund. As such, he entered appearances, appeared and arguec 
as the lawyer for an adverse party against this Appl icanr-'"'' 
lant in the hearings below. Although it was proper for h• 
be appointed as an Administrative Law Judge upon Judge Ful• 
retirement, it was improper and the denial of due proces 0 f· 
him to act in any way as an Adm1n1strative Law .Judge in tr.:• 
The arguments as stated in the previous po1n• 
similiarly apply to Judge Allen. 
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,,,1·;, .is ',·1Pll as his acting against this Applicant-Appellant, 
ri·,1 1 ""' bias and prejudice which should disqualify him. 
J11 '""'ii !·1. there is a specific and explicit statute concern-
Section 78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
c, 111Pr1JeJ, states, in pertinent part: 
Except by consent of all parties, no 
judge shall sit or act as such 
in any action or proceeding: 
(3)When he has been attorney or 
counsel for either party in the action 
or proceeding. 
noted in Val1 Convalescent, supra, and Gibson v. Berryhill, 
supra such concerns apply as well as to Judges as to Administra-
Lat"-' Judges. Thus, it should be clear beyond per adventure 
that it was improper for Judge Allen to have taken any action with 
reqard to this case. Therefore, there being no valid and proper 
Order, this matter should be remanded to the Industrial Commis-
s1on for another hearing with a new Administrative Law Judge. 
The argument in point I with regard to the due process 
claims apply with equal if not greater force in this instance. 
The idea of opposing counsel in a case, being elevated to the 
bench to hear the case prior to the conclusion, in then rendering 
':i1e decision, shocks any sense of fair play. Further, no matter 
nnw fair or impartial the individual feels himself to be, the 
orpearance of impropriety is just to great to allow. As stated 
:iar·shal v. Jerr1co, Inc., supra, the concern is both for the 
•I 1 ""nee cinJ the reality of fairness. Therefore, this lack of 
1 r '""'" J'O a clear sense of injustice requires that the above 
.cicter be remanded to the Industrial Commission for a new hear-
1fl·J .. nth a new Administrative Law Judge. 
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POINT III: THAT IT ',;VAS Ari Al3USF •If· l'1S 
CRETION, ARBITRARY AND CAPHT-
CIOUS FOR THE IllLllJSTikAL i'ClM-
MISSION TO HAVE ADOPTED THE 
MEDICAL PAUEL REPrJHT AS •JPPOSED 
TO THE TREATIUG PHYSICIAU. 
The Applicant-Appellant in this case is well aviare 
the long line of cases which indicate that it is the sole d!'-
cretion of the Industrial Commission to find the facts with re: 
to any disability rating, as well as the period of temporary·: 
disability. This Applicant-Appellant, in the absence of a re.:. 
with which to challenge the findings can not do so. However, 
there is one fact which does appear of record in this case. 
were a number of relevant material tests that the Medical Pano_ 
did not have when it rendered its decision. These were, hm1e·;-
in the possession of the treating physician Dr. McQueen who te: 
fied. Thus, both the Medical Panel and the Industrial Cornmis:: 
ignored pertinent information on the Applicant in 
their rating as well as the date of stabilization. As such, 
constitutes and arbitrary and capricious action to not take tc.• 
into account. 
Claim is also made here that the lack of any recoro 
should entitle this Applicant-Appellant to a new hearing so 
if there is a decision adverse to her, she can bring it for 
view to this Court. As indicated by way of Affidav1 t, as •·1<?' 
the filing of a statement of the proceedings based upon Rule 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the reporter for 
ing, Mr. Dean Ce1ly, was unable to find any of his notes and 
cord1ngs of the hearing which caused there to be no 
Thus, there was no fault of the Applicant-Appellant 
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corney in the lack of record with regard to the above case. Fur-
,,,er, there •>1as a statement of the proceedings filed by Applicant-
•rGellant's counsel with regard to various matters upon which a 
is requested. However, the factual matters concerning 
the medical evidence can not be ascertained. This Court should 
therefore reverse and remand this matter for a new hearing before 
a new Administrative Law Judge. Such an action, based upon the 
lack of a record, was done in the case of Reliance National Life 
Insurance Company v. Caine. 439 P.2d 283, 20 Utah.2d 427 (Utah). 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the above 
entitled matter should be remanded to the Industrial Commission 
for new hearings and proceedings with regard to the Applicant-
Appellant's claim, and that said should be done before another 
and neutral and detached Administrative Law Judge. It is sub-
mitted that each of the six grounds asserted above, the dis-
qualification of both Judge Foley and Judge Allen, the denial 
of due process to the Applicant-Appellant by Judge Foley and 
Judge Allen acting in the case, as well as the arbitrary and 
capricious findings of the Industrial Commission, and finally 
the lack of any transcript with regard to the medical issues, 
requires such an action. 
DATED this of July, 1984. 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
r 
L By I . .._, \ 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Attorney for Applicant-Appellant 
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